“The only chance of survival, when one is sincerely in love, is to conceal it from the woman one loves, to feign a slight detachment in all circumstances.”

— Michel Houellebecq, The Possibility of an Island

Short History

One way to get ensured engagement for farming Musk Bucks on X, is mentioning anything related to the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas as they are called in Argentina. Even the mere mention of the word “Falklands” is enough to make many an Argentine netizen’s blood boil up to the point where a comment to dispute that term is no longer optional, but a necessity: they are called Malvinas.

For the rest of this article I will switch back and forth between these names, because as charged as they may be, they do not seize to be just that: names for two islands in the Argentine Sea.

The United Provinces without a Kingdom already discussed the claim to the islands from both sides briefly. In the words of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

On January 3, 1833, the Falklands were illegally occupied by British forces who evicted the population and the Argentine authorities legitimately established there, replacing them with British subjects who since then established restrictive measures to prevent the resettlement of Argentines.

According to the British, the islands were discovered by an English sailor in 1592 and then competed with Spain for sovereignty. In practice, the Falklands were a no man’s islands ready for the taking and it wasn’t hard to get rid of the Argentine control that was there at the time. Finally in 1833 the United Kingdom expelled the Argentine governor and the garrison, forcibly taking control of the islands to the present day.

The fact that there was even an Argentine governor and garrison to begin with, along with the recent discovery of a formal request from an English captain to Buenos Aires to operate in the archipelago in 1813, kind of blows a bit of a hole in the British historical narrative and strengthens the Argentine case.

Argentina never abandoned its claim for sovereignty over the islands, and after taking the issue to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, it managed to start negotiations with the United Kingdom through UN resolution 1514 of 1960. Unfortunately, negotiations went nowhere.

The British effective control over the islands since 1833 means that most of the Kelper population on the islands is British, and this is usually the main argument for keeping it that way: “the population on the islands do not want to join Argentina”.

In 2013, with Argentina pushing again for sovereignty talks, the islanders held a referendum on whether to stay a British Overseas Territory. Turnout hit 92%, and 99.8% voted to keep things exactly as they were. Three people voted against. Three.

For Argentina, this referendum and the justification of the will of Falkland residents is a non-argument since the population on the islands is viewed as a foreign occupation that was installed to maintain control over them, not a legitimate population.

The 1982 War

Without picking sides, it is clear that the side that holds on to the claim more firmly and with more heartfelt emotion is Argentina, so much so that it was willing to start a war in 1982 to try to recover the islands.

In hindsight the Falklands War would prove to be unfortunate, not just for the lives lost or the timing — the military dictatorship needed a “win” and more popular support, and decided that the Malvinas War was the best way to do so — but also with regards to the broader communication, flights and commerce between the islands and Argentina.

The Malvinas of the 1970s were a forgotten wool outpost, not the prosperous little enclave they like to show today. The local economy was stagnant, population was shrinking, and the islands leaned heavily on Argentina for the basics. Direct flights from the mainland, fuel shipments, and even teachers crossed from the continent under commercial arrangements that Buenos Aires and London had quietly worked out.

By the early 80s, without that lifeline or a serious plan from the UK, the islands were staring at economic collapse. This was a place that needed a war to become viable, lol.

After Galtieri handed London the perfect excuse to pour money in, Britain rebuilt and modernized the islands at scale, with the crown jewel being the Mount Pleasant military airbase.

In 1987 they drew their own Exclusive Economic Zone and started selling fishing licenses to foreign fleets, mostly for squid, which quickly outgrew wool as the main export. GDP per capita jumped into the same bracket as Norway or Switzerland, and unemployment in recent years has sat below 1%. Not bad for a few thousand people on a windswept rock.

For Argentina, the war was a financial disaster on top of a military one. It piled unpayable debt on a country already unraveling, and inflation blew past 200% in 1982 and would climb all the way to over 5,000% around 1989. Any direct commercial link between the continent and the islands was cut, and it has barely recovered since. A rare case where losing a war also meant losing the customer.

Milei’s Vision

This loss of integration with the mainland after the 1982 war makes a Hong Kong-style return of the islands less likely, despite the fact that there is also a minority of Argentine nationals living on the islands.

Even before his presidential campaign, President Javier Milei has always advocated for a solution with those characteristics, and has maintained that stance throughout his presidency:

“We claim sovereignty over the islands. We consider the Malvinas Islands to be Argentine (…) and they are being occupied by the United Kingdom. And we believe that this must be resolved through diplomatic channels, using the model that China employed in the case of Hong Kong.”

Internationally, President Milei reasserted Argentinian sovereignty over the Malvinas immediately after the UK gave up Diego Garcia. For the first time in centuries, no country in Europe is in a position to project hard power globally, and as of late, the diplomatic channels seem to be in Argentina’s favor.

In the most recent Ministerial ZOPACAS Meeting, Argentina highlights the renewed international backing received for its claim of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands:

On April 10, 2026, the Argentine Republic thanks the member states of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)—a group of 24 countries from South America and West Africa—for their firm and renewed backing of Argentina’s position on the Malvinas Question. This support was clearly reaffirmed in the Rio Declaration adopted at the IX Ministerial Meeting held in Rio de Janeiro on April 8–9.

This endorsement demonstrates a consistent and solid regional consensus in favor of Argentina’s sovereign rights, respect for our territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It also confirms the shared commitment to keeping the South Atlantic a zone of peace, cooperation, and stability.

In the Declaration, the member states once again called for the immediate resumption of negotiations between the Argentine Government and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in line with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX) and other relevant UN resolutions, with the goal of reaching a peaceful, just, and lasting solution to the sovereignty dispute as soon as possible.

During the Falklands War, Pinochet’s Chile provided crucial logistics support to the British, which was essential to the British war efforts. The fact that Chile’s President Antonio Kast has now also voiced his support for Argentine sovereignty of the islands, is a telling sign of momentum building up for Argentina’s claim:

During his first international trip since taking office, Kast reaffirmed Chile’s support for Argentina’s “legitimate sovereign rights” over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and their maritime spaces, according to a joint statement from the foreign ministries of Chile and Argentina.

History and population claims aside, what actually makes these islands valuable, and why is this suddenly back on Argentina's front burner?

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Most of you reading this have been following the CBI saga for months. If you haven’t, the short version is in Argentina’s Citizenship Gold Rush and Argentina CBI Fiscal Residency Solution. The program was supposed to be Argentina’s first formal investor citizenship route, run by a new agency called the APCI under the Ministry of Economy, capped at 5,000 approvals over four years.

That program, as designed, is now dead. Here we go.

What the resolution says

You can download the official resolution here:

Rs 2026 37468010 Apn Mec

116KB ∙ PDF file

Download

Download

The official document (RESOL-2026-522-APN-MEC) cancels Concurso Público N° 34-0001-CPU25, the international tender that was supposed to pick the consulting firm to design, launch and run the entire CBI operation.

Six firms bid back in January 2026. By March, the Evaluation Commission had recommended a winner. By April, the whole thing was in the bin.

The reason given in the resolution is masterful jerga oficial:

“...subsisten divergencias relevantes en cuanto a los enfoques propuestos y su adecuación integral a los objetivos de la política pública a desarrollar.”

Translated: relevant divergences persist regarding the proposed approaches and their integral adequacy to the public policy objectives being developed.

In plain English: the bids didn’t actually match what the government needs. So they killed the tender, returned the bid guarantees, and walked away. No compensation owed to anyone. Article 20 of Decree 1023/2001 lets them do exactly this.

The Bidders, and why most of them got tossed

Six firms showed up at the January 20 opening:

1. Hong Kong Qian Cheng Business Co., Ltd. (China)

2. Latitude Consultancy Malta Limited

3. Salzburg International for Law LLC (Reach Immigration)

4. Ancova Associates FZCO (UAE)

5. Henley & Partners Immigration Services FZCO

6. Asesorías Legal Advisor Limitada (Chile)

Four of them were eliminated before the real evaluation even started:

• Hong Kong Qian Cheng wired its $1.25M bid guarantee into its own account at China Construction Bank instead of the Banco Nación account specified in the pliego. The funds arrived ten days late. Disqualified.

• Salzburg International uploaded a SWIFT bank guarantee to the COMPR.AR system but never delivered the physical document with proper translation and certification. Disqualified.

• Latitude Consultancy failed the financial solvency tests. Indebtedness ratio came in at 1.36 against a maximum of 0.50. Solvency ratio was 1.73 against a minimum of 2.00. Numbers do not lie.

• Ancova Associates submitted a “Rectification of the Technical and Financial Proposal” when asked for clarifications, which the evaluators ruled was a modification of their original bid. Argentine procurement law has a principle called inmodificabilidad de las ofertas. You cannot change your bid after submission. Disqualified.

That left two finalists: Henley & Partners and Asesorías Legal Advisor Limitada.

The Chilean front

Now here is where it gets interesting. The Chilean firm was not really a Chilean law firm doing this alone. It was the legal vehicle for a four-firm international consortium operating under the structure Asesorías Legal Advisor Limitada – UT Consorcio AAPA. The “UT” stands for Unión Transitoria (temporary joint venture) and AAPA is the acronym of the four firms involved.

Per IMI Daily’s reporting on the March 5 evaluation report, the four firms behind the Chilean shell were:

• Apex Capital Partners

• AIM Global

• Passport Legacy

• Arton Capital

A consortium of four investment migration firms, fronted by a Chilean limitada to clear local procurement requirements. Smart structure. Probably saved them weeks of paperwork. Until it didn’t.

The Bid Gap

Both finalists looked roughly equal on paper. Henley & Partners and the Chilean-fronted consortium scored identically on the technical evaluation, until the envelopes with the prices came out.

As noted in the IMI Daily article, the bids diverged quite a bit:

Where the bids diverged was in price. The economic evaluation, weighted at 40% of the total score, overwhelmed Henley’s position.

The consortium bid $10,000 per tranche across all five tranches of 1,000 applications each, totaling $50,000 for the entire contract. Henley bid $2 million for the first tranche, escalating to $8 million for the fifth, totaling $25 million.

So much so that the spread was 500x between the two:

That is not a typo. The consortium offered to design, launch, promote and run Argentina’s entire CBI program for four years for fifty thousand US tokens. Henley wanted twenty-five million.

So either the consortium was promising to do the job for less than the cost of a used Toyota Hilux in Palermo, or Henley was charging Argentine government rates because they assumed Argentina would pay them. Neither read flatters anyone involved.

The math from there was a formality. The consortium won the price round by such a wide margin that nothing else mattered. They walked away with the recommendation, Henley filed an impugnación, and somebody at MECON finally sat down and asked what fifty thousand dollars actually buys you when you’re trying to attract five thousand millionaires to a country like Argentina.

The answer, apparently, was: not enough.

Why the government walked away

Read the timeline carefully:

• March 5, 2026: Evaluation Commission recommends awarding to the consortium.

• March-April 2026: Henley & Partners and Latitude both file impugnaciones (formal legal challenges) to the award.

• April 14, 2026: Minister Caputo signs a resolution killing the entire tender, citing “strategic and policy concerns.”

The resolution does not say it directly, but the pattern is obvious: after the impugnaciones came in, the Legal and Administrative Secretariat of the Ministry took another look at the actual proposals.

Their conclusion, per the official text, was that “the continuity of the procedure under the current conditions could not ensure the degree of coherence, integrality and strategic articulation required for the adequate implementation of the program.”

Translation: somebody finally read the consortium’s $50,000 bid and asked the obvious question. What do you actually get for fifty grand? A program that processes 5,000 millionaire applicants and is supposed to attract billions in foreign investment, run on the budget of a midsize wedding. The answer was clearly not enough. Probably no marketing infrastructure, no global outreach budget, no due diligence apparatus that could survive an FATF audit.

Henley’s $25M bid was almost certainly closer to or slightly above what running a real CBI program actually costs. They have run programs in St. Kitts, Malta, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, and at least three other jurisdictions since 2017. They know what the line items look like.

So the government had two bad options:

1. Award the contract to the cheap bidder, watch the program fail to launch properly, and eat the political cost.

2. Award the contract to Henley at $25M, get hammered for awarding a no-bid premium contract to a foreign multinational after a process that recommended someone else.

They chose option three: kill the whole thing and start over. Or maybe not start over at all and just build it in-house through APCI directly. That part is still unclear.

Some Important Sidenotes

A few things to keep in mind before drawing conclusions:

The CBI program itself is not dead. Decree 524/2025 still exists. The legal framework for the APCI agency that will control the CBI applications still exists. What just died is the specific tender for the master consultant who was supposed to build the program. The government can issue a new tender, restructure the procurement, or build the operational capacity in-house through APCI directly.

This is not a policy reversal. Nothing in the resolution says Milei is backing away from CBI as a concept. The opposite, actually. The reasoning is about getting the implementation right, not about questioning the goal.

There is a procedural appeal window. Bidders have 20 business days to file a recurso de reconsideración or 30 days for a recurso jerárquico. The Chilean consortium can challenge this. Whether they will, given the cost of fighting the Argentine state and the slim odds of reversing a Ministerial signature, is a different question. This Mara would be surprised if anyone bothers to deal with that, and it would probably not reach an outcome before the end of Milei’s first term, knowing the snail pace of the Argentine justice system.

The timeline just got pushed back significantly. Anyone who was expecting the CBI program to actually open for applications in 2026 should adjust their expectations. New tender, new evaluation, new appeals window, new contract negotiations, or maybe the government will decide to structure the whole thing in-house. We are probably looking at Q4 2026 at the earliest for a relaunch, and that assumes everything moves quickly. Argentine bureaucracy does not move quickly.

Final Thoughts

Argentina just demonstrated something pretty important about how the Milei government handles procurement. The standard Latin American playbook would have been to let the cheap bid win, sign the contract, watch the program fail in slow motion over 18 months, blame the consultant, and move on. That is the South American baseline and we have all seen that movie.

Instead, somebody at MECON read the bids, did the math, and concluded that the cheapest option was not viable. They then killed the process and accepted the political cost rather than ship a broken product. That is not how things normally work here. It could even be a small but real signal that the institutional DNA at the Ministry of Economy is changing.

Whether the next iteration of the CBI tender produces a workable program is a separate question. But the fact that this one got killed before launch instead of after is, in Argentine context, almost an upgrade.

This rodent will be watching for the next tender announcement. When it comes, the structure will tell you everything about whether the government has actually learned anything. If the new pliego requires bidders to demonstrate global marketing capacity, if it sets minimum operational budgets, if it weights track record more heavily than raw price, then somebody at MECON paid attention. If the new tender just relaunches the same structure with the same scoring criteria, expect the same outcome.

For now, the citizenship gold rush is on pause. And it is not the only route that's frozen. Decree 366/2025 from May last year moved naturalization processing from the federal courts to Migraciones (DNM). Almost a year later, the kiosko at Migraciones still does not exist. No new applications have been processed since the decree, and the only cases moving are the grandfathered ones still sitting on judges' desks from before the handover.

So as of right now: no working CBI tender, no functioning naturalization pipeline, and no clear timeline for either. The door to the Argentine passport is technically open. Practically, nobody is at the desk.

See you in the Jungle, anon!

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Other ways to get in touch:

• 1x1 Consultations: book a 1x1 consultation for more information about obtaining residency, citizenship or investing in real estate in Argentina here.

• Propertyinbuenosaires.com: personal resource website with everything you need to know about buying and selling property in Argentina.

• X/Twitter: definitely most active here, you can also find me on Instagram but I hardly use that account.

• Podcasts: You can find previous appearances on podcasts etc here.

• YouTube: Check out my channel for real estate info and more.

• WiFi Agency: My other (paid) blog on how to start a digital agency from A to Z.

Last month I walked you through the launch: institutional-grade reports produced by the team advising the Milei administration on macro policy, now translated and adapted for the Founding Member tier. If you missed the first issue, it is sitting in your inbox or the archive.

This April report is, in one word, spicy.

GDP hit an all-time high, the energy sector is printing dollars, country risk keeps dropping, and the Second Circuit in New York handed Argentina an incredible win on the YPF case. At the same time, Milei took a real political hit with the Adorni scandal, and inflation has gotten slightly sticky before what is expected to be a sharp decline in 2027.

Here is what is covered inside:

• The Good: GDP, energy, YPF, and country risk all hitting milestones worth paying attention to

• The Bishop Situation: the political hit Milei just took, and who is really being targeted

• Inflation Mechanics: why the monthly rate got sticky, and the 2027 call the macro team is putting on the table

• The YPF Ruling: an 11-figure tail risk just got cut, with direct implications for the 2027 runway

• The Silver Lining: which sectors have to die for the economy to get healthier, with hard productivity data

• My read: what it means for real estate, CBI timing, and ARS-exposed businesses

Founding Members: scroll down for the full April report. If you are still on the fence, this is the kind of primary-source intelligence that institutional clients pay 20 to 30 times the subscription price to access, and you get a front-row seat here.

To the data.

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The short version: transaction volume is still digesting the post-election mortgage hangover, listing prices are stabilizing after months of drift, and pozo developers are quietly raising prices on new launches while sitting on existing projects.

Three signals pointing in three different directions, which is usually the kind of moment where paying attention pays off.

Mortgage issuance was the engine behind much of 2025’s transaction recovery. That engine sputtered in October when the BCRA jacked up reserve requirements ahead of the Midterms, and we are still seeing the lagged effects work through the deed registrations.

The good news is that the BCRA is finally unwinding those encajes, with another cut coming in April. Whether that translates into actual loan volume is the question of the next two quarters.

Now for the actual February / March numbers and a personal note on one of my pozos.

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On March 27, the New York Court of Appeals overturned the lower court’s ruling against Argentina for the expropriation of YPF. The New York appeals court ruled that judge Preska had misinterpreted Argentine law.

Beyond any appeals that may arise, this is a victory for Argentina in a trial that lasted more than a decade, in which it had been ordered by Loretta Preska to pay a sum of more than $16 billion dollars, by now $18 billion with interest.

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This month's report, "Macro Challenges for 2026-27" tackles the question that everyone with skin in the Argentine game is asking right now: can the recovery hold, or has the initial rebound already played out?

If you’ve been following this blog, you know I’ve covered this question from multiple angles in Argentina’s Challenges in 2026 and Lionheart: Milei’s First Year in Office.

What makes this report different is the source: these are the projections and frameworks that the people running the economy are actually using. That context is hard to get anywhere else in English.

A few highlights of what you’ll find below:

• Inflation came down from 211% to 31%, but has been hovering around 3% monthly since late 2025. The report explains why, and why that’s actually by design.

• Reserve accumulation is the government’s top priority right now. Around USD 3.3 billion has been added so far in 2026, and that number could exceed USD 8 billion before mid-year.

• The debt maturity wall: roughly USD 35 billion is due between now and the end of 2027. How the government plans to manage this without turning on the peso printer is the central question of the next 20 months.

• Exports hit a record USD 87 billion in 2025 and are still growing, driven by energy and agriculture. The second quarter will bring peak seasonal inflows, adding even more appreciation pressure on the peso.

After the report, I’ve added my own comments on what this means for you as a reader, investor, or someone evaluating Argentina as a base.

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Starting now, BowTiedMara Founding Members will receive the same macroeconomic report that lands on the desk of the President of Argentina to inform policy decisions.

This is not something metaphorical, these are the actual macro reports that land on President Milei’s desk.

Macro Reports

I’ve partnered with the professionals behind the BCRA’s economic models and one of the key advisory voices in the Milei administration. They produce institutional-grade macro reports covering the full spectrum of Argentine economic data: inflation, GDP, fiscal balance, monetary policy, exchange rate dynamics, trade, energy, agriculture, you name it.

This is the same intelligence that informs presidential decision-making in Argentina. The same data the Minister of Economy Luis Caputo reviews, and the same projections that institutional investors, local multinationals and sovereign wealth funds pay serious money to access.

Up until now, this kind of analysis was only available to a very small circle of government officials, institutional clients, and financial advisors. It was not available to retail investors, expats, sovereign individuals, or anyone outside that circle.

Now it is, through the blog of this Dutch/Patagonian rodent.

Why this matters for you

If you are:

• Investing in Argentine real estate, equities, or bonds

• Running a business with ARS exposure

• Evaluating Argentina’s CBI program for yourself or clients

• Making geoarbitrage decisions about where to park capital

• Simply trying to understand where this country is heading under Milei

...then you’ve been making those decisions based on secondary sources, translated summaries, and Twitter threads (some of which are mine, so at least they’re decent). But you haven’t had access to the primary source material that the people actually running this economy use to make their calls.

Until today.

What Founding Members get

1. The Argentina Macro Report (monthly)

A comprehensive macroeconomic briefing covering all key indicators, projections, and policy analysis. This is not a newsletter recap or a blog post with charts. This is an institutional product, delivered to you in the same format it’s delivered to the Casa Rosada.

The report is in English, and I will also provide my own commentary for what it means for real estate, for CBI, for the peso, for your specific situation as a sovereign individual or investor operating in Argentina. The raw data is one thing; knowing how to apply it to your decisions is another.

This week I will send out the March update, and the next updates will be posted around the second week of each month.

2. Monthly Zoom Calls with Milei’s Advisors

Once we hit 20 Founding Members, we will host monthly live Zoom calls where you can ask questions directly to the team advising the Argentine government.

This means you will be able to ask questions to the people advising the President of Argentina on economic policy, on a monthly basis.

I don’t know of any other Substack or newsletter in any language that offers this kind of access. If you’re active in Argentine markets or considering a significant move here, this alone is worth multiples of the subscription price.

If you know someone who would benefit from this (an investor, a fund manager, a family office looking at Argentina, someone in the CBI space) send them this post. Let’s hit that 20 Founding Member threshold, anon.

Pricing

The Founding Member plan is moving to $300/year.

If you’re a current Founding Member at the original $90 rate: you’re grandfathered in. You backed this blog before anyone knew what it would become, some of you have been here since the early days when the only perk was a DM channel. That loyalty is not forgotten. You will receive the monthly Argentina Macro reports and access to the Zoom calls at your current rate. No action needed on your end.

For new Founding Members, the price is $300/year.

I’ll be transparent about the economics: the bulk of that goes to the analysts for producing the reports and making their team available. I will only receive a minority share. I am leveraging my network to get you access to intelligence that would otherwise cost you at least 20-30x through an institutional consulting engagement, if you could even get a seat at the table.

If you’re already a paid subscriber, thank you. You already support the work and get access to the CBI deep dives, immigration policy breakdowns, and all the other paid content (which will still include a lot of my own economic inputs.

The Founding Member tier is specifically for those who want the institutional macro layer on top.

Subscribe/Upgrade

You can upgrade to the Founding Member plan below. Current Founding Members are already locked in at $90, and can enjoy the ride. For everyone else, $300/year gets you in at the ground floor of something that will only get more valuable as the Zoom calls activate and this new community grows.

Become a Founding Member

This is one of those rare situations where the timing, the access, and the moment in Argentine history all line up. The country is in the middle of the most ambitious economic transformation in its modern history. The people advising that transformation are now accessible to you through this blog.

Don’t sleep on it, anon.

See you in the Jungle.

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Other ways to get in touch:

• 1x1 Consultations: book a 1x1 consultation for more information about obtaining residency, citizenship or investing in real estate in Argentina here.

• X/Twitter: definitely most active here, you can also find me on Instagram but I hardly use that account.

• Podcasts: You can find previous appearances on podcasts etc here.

• YouTube: Check out my channel for real estate info and more.

• WiFi Agency: My other (paid) blog on how to start a digital agency from A to Z.

In the second week of March, governor Axel Kicillof and former President Mauricio Macri had what should have appeared to be a casual encounter during the Expo Agro exhibition in San Nicolás, province of Buenos Aires, where they shared the main table.

In Argentina, these encounters are never random, and you can practically set the clock to some political announcement or some breaking news stories hitting the press shortly after. From that perspective, this “random” encounter did not disappoint.

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CBI Program Recap

In previous articles (see links at the bottom of this article), I’ve discussed the initial stages and creation of the CBI program, but in case you missed these here’s the overall timeline that lead to what will soon lead to the official launch of the program.

The legal foundation for Argentina’s citizenship by investment program was laid in mid-2025. Decree 366/25 modified Argentina’s Citizenship Law (Ley 346) to allow foreign nationals to obtain citizenship by naturalization, regardless of how long they’ve resided in the country. As long as they can can demonstrate a “relevant investment,” that is enough to apply for citizenship.

In July 2025 through Decree 524/2025, Milei established the procedural framework: applications would be received and evaluated by a new decentralized citizenship agency, the Agencia de Programas de Ciudadanía por Inversión (APCI), operating within the Ministry of Economy.

The APCI doesn’t act alone. Milei’s decree requires that before any citizenship is granted, the agency must request assessments from the Ministry of Security, the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF), the National Registry of Recidivism, RENAPER, and SIDE (Argentina’s intelligence service/CIA), among other bodies. Of course this is standard process of the due diligence for most citizenship by investment programs.

While some Argentines have started to worry about the credibility of the Argentine passport once the CBI program is launched, the approval process will also take into account security protocols from third countries, including those applicable under a potential US visa waiver program.

So Milei & Co are definitely aware of the importance of not staining the Argentine passport through a CBI program — some programs like Vanuatu have ran into issues like no more visa free travel to the EU because of the low investment amount and not enough due diligence in the application process.

In January of this year the Argentine government launched a tender to hire a master agent that will assist the APCI technically by designing, promoting, and operating the CBI program. The contract would run for four years (with an optional fifth) or until 5,000 citizenship approval recommendations are issued, whichever comes first.

This brings us to today.

Argentina’s Bid Evalutions

Four of the six original bidders were eliminated before scoring even began. The reasons for elimination were multiple according to IMI Daily:

• Hong Kong Qian Cheng deposited its $1.25M guarantee into its own China Construction Bank account instead of the Ministry’s designated Banco Nación account, arriving ten days past the January 20 deadline. Besides the initial mistake, the funds not arriving on time looks like a typical wire transfer failure which are oh so common when interacting with Argentine banking system.

• Salzburg International (Reach Immigration) uploaded a SWIFT bank guarantee but never delivered the physical document with the required translation and certification, and in Argentina the government still loves paper and stamps (certified translations).

• Latitude Consultancy failed financial solvency thresholds; its indebtedness ratio was 1.36 (max 0.50) and solvency ratio was 1.73 (min 2.00).

• Ancova Associates was disqualified for submitting a “Rectification” that amounted to modifying its original bid (violating the immutability principle), and separately failed the minimum profit-to-sales ratio.

The Fantastic Four

In the bid evaluation report dated March 5 and published on the government’s COMPR.AR procurement portal, the Ministry recommended awarding the CBI master agent contract to a four-company consortium operating under the name Asesorías Legal Advisor Limitada – UT Consorcio AAPA.

This consortium brings together four RCBI firms: Apex Capital Partners, AIM Global, Passport Legacy, and Arton Capital.

The group finished first with a total score of 88 points out of 100. Henley & Partners, the only other bidder to survive the admissibility stage, came in second with 48.09 points.

The consortium that submitted the winning bid had already been positioning itself publicly in Argentine media well before the bid evaluation was released. In a widely shared Infobae article from January 28, leaders of the consortium made their case for the program’s potential.

Matías Apparcel, the Chilean lawyer who serves as CEO of AIM Global, emphasized the strategic opportunity for Argentina to direct capital toward key sectors. Apparcel pointed to the US EB-5 residency by investment model as a precedent, noting that the American program has attracted between $55 and $60 billion since its creation and generated hundreds of thousands of jobs:

“The key lies in the commitment to the country and the possibility that the Government will direct the funds towards strategic sectors such as infrastructure, energy, agribusiness, technology, housing and regional development projects.”
— Matías Apparcel, CEO de AIM Global, quoted in Infobae

Nuri Katz, the founder and CEO of Apex Capital Partners, framed the challenge in terms of institutional design rather than just capital attraction. Speaking to La Brújula 24, Katz stressed that the program’s success would depend on building it with strict controls and clearly defined investment objectives, and that Argentina’s challenge was to make the program synonymous with transparency and quality in the eyes of the global community.

Jeffrey Henseler, Chairman of Passport Legacy — the Swiss firm that recently implemented a fully private CBI agency in São Tomé and Príncipe — described the CBI model as widely validated globally and backed by regulatory frameworks across more than 80 countries.

According to estimates from the consortium’s own teams, as reported by Infobae, the program could channel more than $2.5 billion in foreign direct investment in its early stages and attract around 5,000 families seeking Argentine citizenship through qualifying investments.

Two Finalists

Both Henley & Partners and the Consortium scored identically on the technical evaluation (80/100, weighted to 48 points each out of 60).

The consortium was praised for its interdisciplinary multi-firm structure and scored highly on singularity, expertise, and international network, though some members' experience documentation leaned on generic licensing arrangements. It was a smart move to team up between multiple firms, and Arton Capital and Passport Legacy were the ones credited with actual program implementation.

Henley & Partners brought contracts with at least seven governments dating to 2017, but evaluators flagged its proposed financial execution model as cumbersome for Argentina's public sector framework and its projected costs as elevated.

Eventually, for the Argentine government, it came down to price:

The consortium bid $10,000 per tranche across all five tranches of 1,000 applications each, totaling $50,000 for the entire contract. Henley bid $2 million for the first tranche, escalating to $8 million for the fifth, totaling $25 million.

After applying the weighted coefficients specified in the tender, the consortium’s offer produced a weighted total of $75,000; Henley’s came to $33.75 million. Under the scoring formula, which divides the lowest weighted bid by each bidder’s and multiplies by 100, the consortium received a perfect 100 on the economic component (reduced to 40 after the 40% coefficient). Henley received 0.2222, reduced to 0.0889.

Final scores: Consortium 88.00, Henley 48.0889.

The Fiscal Residency Fix

I wrote about this last week but it remains one of the most important changes that Argentina has implemented for the CBI program, which it cancels automatic tax residency — one of the CBI program’s single largest fiscal obstacles.

Normally, obtaining citizenship by naturalization would make you an Argentine national for tax purposes, meaning a CBI investor who never sets foot in the country beyond the application process would suddenly owe taxes to AFIP (now ARCA) on every dollar earned anywhere in the world. For a program trying to attract high-net-worth individuals, this was a dealbreaker.

Unfortunately that deal breaker is not available for this rodent as a permanent resident, lol.

Autist note — you can find an overview of the main Argentina CBI articles here:

Next pasitos for the CBI Program

The master agent recommendation is not yet a final award. Under Argentina’s procurement rules, bidders have three days from the communication of the evaluation report to file challenges. Once any challenges are resolved and the contracting authority issues a formal adjudicación, the consortium will take on its mandate.

The scope of that mandate is significant: the consortium will be building Argentina’s CBI program essentially from scratch.

Investment thresholds, eligible sectors, processing routes, and other program parameters remain undefined and we still have no idea of the investment requirements that Consortium will recommend for this program.

The master agent will design all of it.

What the consortium has publicly signalled, is a vision centered on directing investment toward infrastructure, energy, agribusiness, technology, housing, and regional development (see quote above).

The CBI program sits alongside the existing RIGI program (Régimen de Incentivos a las Grandes Inversiones) as part of a broader strategy to attract foreign capital under the Milei administration. These two could potentially be tied together, although the RIGI program was recently extended for only another year, so the window for matching the CBI investments with the RIGI program might be a bit tight.

What About Citizenship Without Investment?

The CBI option is a shortcut for people who would otherwise have a hard time qualifying for Argentine citizenship since Milei made the citizenship through residency process more difficult in May 2025: you can only apply if you have legal permanent residency, and haven’t been out of the country in the preceding two years.

For non-Mercosur citizens, this effectively means 3 years, since that is the timeline to get permanent residency (for Mercosur it is 2), and then not leaving for the last 2 years. Very unrealistic for most people who need to travel for business and family every few months.

So if that is a hurdle — which it will be for the vast majority of foreign residents in Argentina —, then the CBI is the only alternative to get Argentine citizenship, although it is capped at 5,000 passports (for now).

To make matters worse for people who plan on applying for citizenship through residency, my immigration contacts told me that the citizenship office at Migraciones basically does not really exist / do anything yet in practice.

So since May 2025, Argentina has not been issuing new citizenships/naturalizations unless these were started through the previous judicial process that was in place before Milei changed the application procedure to Migraciones — you are reading one very happy rodent who applied just 2 months before that change. I am still waiting on my appointment with a judge, now a full 12 months into my initial application, lol.

Final Thoughts

Argentina’s CBI procurement has been one of the most closely watched processes in the investment migration space. It is a unique way to structure a citizenship by investment program, and in my opinion this will pay off. It is a lot smarter to let experts in the space design a program vs leaving it to government bureaucrats who have no idea of the ideal structure for the CBI investor persona.

With the fiscal residency obstacle now legislatively resolved, the two biggest question marks hanging over the program have been addressed in the same week: 1) who will run it, and 2) whether holding the passport will trigger worldwide taxation.

The answer to the first is a four-firm consortium. The answer to the second is no (unless you decide to stay in Argentina for more than 12 months).

See you in the Jungle, anon!

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Other ways to get in touch:

• 1x1 Consultations: book a 1x1 consultation for more information about obtaining residency, citizenship or investing in Argentina here.

• March 2026 Event: The Wandering Investor Live Group Trip: Buenos Aires 2026. Get tickets here. (SOLD OUT)

• X/Twitter: definitely most active here, you can also find me on Instagram but I hardly use that account.

• Podcasts: You can find previous appearances on podcasts etc here.

• YouTube: Check out my channel for real estate info and more.

• WiFi Agency: My other (paid) blog on how to start a digital agency from A to Z.

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In the words of the Argentine tax authority ARCA, under the Tax Innocence Law:

[…] a persecutory regime is left behind. Decades of currency controls, high inflation, volatility, and a suffocating tax system pushed millions of Argentinians into the informal economy and tax evasion.

Under that system, everyone was considered a tax evader.

The Tax Innocence Law sets things right and gives Argentinians back the freedom to use their money without having to explain themselves to anyone.

Among the main points of this paradigm shift is that the threshold for simple tax evasion is raised to 100 million pesos, and the threshold for aggravated tax evasion to 1 billion pesos. The statute of limitations for the crime has also been modified, decreasing from 5 years to 3 years. This means that those who register for the RSG (Taxpayer Registry) in the coming months will not be subject to investigation starting in 2029.

Furthermore, tax evasion will no longer be a criminal offense. Anyone who fails to comply and is notified can resolve the issue by paying their debt without facing criminal charges.

Innocent until proven guilty is something more tax authorities should implement.

The new scheme establishes a legal freeze on the tax history of those who correctly adhere to the new Simplified Income Tax Regime, created by the new law, and file their tax return on time and in the proper format.

From that moment on, a tax freeze is created, and in this way, ARCA (the Argentine tax authority) cannot audit or determine tax discrepancies corresponding to previous tax years.

The regulation prevents the application of the concept of unjustified increase in net worth; which means that the tax authorities cannot presume tax evasion when a person shows an increase in assets or expenses that does not match their declared income, even when the agency cross-references information with other taxes.

After the announcement, Minister Luis Caputo said:

“Now, everyone should put their savings in the bank.

This would significantly accelerate economic growth, allow us to lower taxes more quickly, become more competitive, increase employment, and improve wages.

Plus, they would earn interest on their dollars. All benefits!”

Furthermore, the criminal thresholds for tax evasion were substantially raised, the statute of limitations for tax crimes was reduced from 5 to 3 years, and administrative regularization was prioritized over criminal proceedings.

All in all, it has the same effects as a tax amnesty, but in the form of a permanent regime conditioned on future compliance. The scope of the Tax Innocence regime is determined by two key conditions: who can adhere to the scheme and who is excluded based on income or net worth.

This new measure is part of a series of actions that Javier Milei’s government has been promoting in the areas of tax and macroeconomic policy. We have discussed the 2024 blanqueo (tax amnesty), which allowed tax payers to declare up to 100k USD of previously undeclared savings without paying any additional taxes. Anything over 100k was subject to 5%.

In total, close to $20 billion USD was declared in that effort.

This new law structurally modifies the relationship between the State and taxpayers, and it is Minister Luis Caputo’s strategy to get Argentines to take the estimated US$200 billion they are hiding from the fiscal authority to invest it in productive activities.

The regulations stipulate that up to $1 billion pesos (approximately US$689,000) will be exempt from income tax when depositing funds in banks. The aim is to reduce criminal and administrative pressure on taxpayers considered to be acting in “good faith” and to focus controls on serious and fraudulent schemes.

The threshold for simple tax evasion rises from $1.5 million to $100 million pesos, while the threshold for aggravated tax evasion increases from $15 million to $1 billion pesos.

But these new regs will not apply to everyone indiscriminately: the possibility of using undeclared savings without tax consequences is directly linked to voluntary enrollment in a new tax system.

Those who can use their dollars without any consequences are those who are registered for Income Tax and voluntarily enroll in the new Simplified Tax Regime. Those who do not join this system remain subject to standard tax controls.

The Monotributo / Autónomos Debate

The Monotributo regime was originally created in 1998 in an attempt to formalize a large portion of the working population that falls under small-scale contributors. As of 2026, there are approximately 4.7 million Argentines registered in this tax category.

Autónomos, on the other hand, is the standard/full tax regime for independent workers who don’t qualify for (or have outgrown) the Monotributo category. It is no wonder that this category only has around 420,000 registered tax payers.

Monotributistas greatly outnumber Autónomos because the simplified regime is designed for smaller operations and has much lower barriers to entry and compliance. Many people start as Monotributistas and only switch to Autónomo if they exceed billing limits or need full deductions/scalability.

It allows freelancers to bill up to +/- 70K usd per year and only pay 15% tax by a subscription fee every month, without having to add VAT on their invoices.

Much better than the Autónomos category, which immediately triggers a 35% tax AND forces the tax payers in that category to add 21% VAT on every invoice. If you are a partner or own a company in Argentina, you are automatically placed in this category.

Needless to say that the vast majority of small contributors are all Monotributistas, and with Milei having changed the upper invoicing limit from roughly 18k to 68k, it makes less sense than ever to hop over to a much more tax heavy Autónomos category.

IMF & Monotributo

There has been a long debate from the IMF since its 2018 Stand-By Arrangement and 2019 reviews emphasized strengthening the administration of the Monotributo and addressing evasion/abuse, without proposing to eliminate the regime itself.

Last year, rumours spurred up once more that the IMF was gunning for an end of the 4.7 million Monotributistas who would all have to move to the Autónomos category, paying much higher taxes. This turned out to be fake news and was later denied by President Javier Milei as well:

“These are lies and operations by criminals who use the credentials of journalists.”

For now, it definitely looks like an impossible and very undesirable option to nuke the Monotributo category from the tax menu.

However, it is no surprise that the tax payers registered under the simplified tax regime (Monotributo) will not be able to access the new fiscal innocence system that launched this week. While Monotributo taxpayers receive benefits to avoid feeling targeted, they do not have the specific benefits of this law and its regulations.

With this Tax Innocence law, the government expects more Monotributistas to hop over to become Autónomos, but unless they are way over there skies billing wise, it does not make a lot of sense. Another downside is that they will not be able to switch back to the Monotributo regime for the next 3 years after making the change.

Final Thoughts

The Tax Innocence law sounds very reasonable, but it remains to be seen how this new law will be implemented in practice: what if monotributistas who cannot adhere to this new regime get more tax audits / controls because of it? This remains to be seen.

This tax innocence law is yet another attempt at getting Argentines to spend and invest their non-declared savings in the local economy. However, today there are little incentives to do so. About half of the economy is “off the books”, and this will remain unchanged unless the upcoming pension and tax reforms align incentives so that these savings can enter the official banking rails and tax filings.

The tax and labor reforms are still scheduled for Q1 2026, but it remains to be seen how much will effectively change in the final text that passes in both chambers.

Unless there will be much better tax structures for entrepreneurs, it is doubtful that more private undeclared savings will enter the system than has already happened under the blanqueo / tax amnesty.

See you in the Jungle, anon!

Share

Other ways to get in touch:

• 1x1 Consultations: book a 1x1 consultation for more information about obtaining residency, citizenship or investing in Argentina here.

• March 2026 Event: The Wandering Investor Live Group Trip: Buenos Aires 2026. Get tickets here. (SOLD OUT)

• X/Twitter: definitely most active here, you can also find me on Instagram but I hardly use that account.

• Podcasts: You can find previous appearances on podcasts etc here.

• YouTube: Check out my channel for real estate info and more.

• WiFi Agency: My other (paid) blog on how to start a digital agency from A to Z.

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Argentina’s completely transparent CBI tender (34-0001-CPU25), managed by the Ministry of Economy, closed on January 20, 2026, attracted interest from 11 firms, though only six finalized their offers.

The way the tender text was structured already excluded many CBI firms from even applying, and the prerequisites were so specific that virtually only these six firms (and potentially less) could qualify as the Master Agent, like I mentioned in a previous article:

To qualify, firms must showcase established experience in residency and citizenship by investment (RCBI) programs. A key mandatory criterion is at least one government mandate in the field over the last 10 years.

As of this moment there are at least four firms that I know of that will be applying, and this number will likely increase over the upcoming days.

The senior leadership team must include at least five directors or executives, each with a minimum of five years dedicated to RCBI projects. Bids must include comprehensive CVs detailing specific roles and achievements in past initiatives.

Bidders and Government Compensation Proposals

In an act of total transparency, the Argentine government published some details of the bids online:

The bids specify payments from the government for 5,000 approved applications, structured in five tranches of 1,000 each:

• Consortium (Apex Capital Partners, AIM Global, Passport Legacy, Arton Capital): $50,000 total ($10 per application across all tranches)

• Latitude Consultancy Malta: $7.5 million (from $1,000 to $2,000 per application)

• Henley & Partners: $25 million (from $2,000 to $8,000 per application)

• Hong Kong Qian Cheng Business Co.: $25 million ($5,000 flat per application)

• Salzburg International For Law: $34.5 million (descending from $8,280 to $6,210 per application)

• Ancova Associates: $100 million ($20,000 flat per application)

Three bidders opted for flat rates, while the others used variable structures that adjust over tranches (averages shown):

Flat pricing:

• Consortium: $10 per application

• Hong Kong Qian Cheng: $5,000 per application

• Ancova: $20,000 per application

Variable pricing:

• Henley & Partners: 300% escalation from $2,000 to $8,000 (average ~$5,000)

• Latitude Consultancy Malta: 100% escalation from $1,000 to $2,000 (average ~$1,500)

• Salzburg: 25% reduction from $8,280 to $6,210 (average ~$6,900)

The Consortium’s ultra-low $10 bid seems like a bit of a joke: it is 100 times lower than Latitude’s starting rate and far below others.

This approach likely relies on direct fees charged to investors for processing, due diligence, and services, rather than government payouts, and is not unusual in the industry.

Argentina’s tender allows contractors to collect such fees separately, enabling the consortium to prioritize market control and investor relationships over maximizing state compensation.

In order to explain the tiered or tranched approach, this IMI Daily article gives a great overview of how Argentina structured the contract across five tranches of 1,000 applications each:

Key Tender Features

One of the most interesting details in the tender is the payment restriction for applications submitted directly by the agent:

“The tender compensates contractors only for applications that independent certified agents submit, not for self-sourced cases. This clause prevents market monopolization while requiring ecosystem development.

At the Consortium’s $10 rate, government payments generate just $50,000 across the full contract. At Latitude’s rates, agent-submitted applications produce $7.5 million. Henley’s structure yields $25 million. Salzburg’s descending fees collect $34.5 million. Ancova receives $100 million.

All bidders must charge investors directly for processing and due diligence to cover operational costs. The payment restriction forces this dual revenue model.”

Furthermore, all bidders were required to provide 5% bid bonds in USD, totaling $9.6 million across the bids, with most secured via insurance, one through a cash deposit, and another via a bank guarantee; the winning bidder’s bond will convert to a 10% maintenance guarantee.

More public details about the tender remain limited beyond the disclosed pricing, bonds, and guarantees. So we still don’t know more about the proposed structure of the CBI program by the bidders.

Investment options, minimum thresholds, eligible sectors, and other program specifics are still awaiting finalization by the winning master agent and the Agencia de Programas de Ciudadanía por Inversión (APCI).

Final Thoughts

This tender reflects Argentina’s innovative approach to launching its CBI framework, outsourcing core design and operations to a single expert provider while balancing technical capability with economic incentives. As far as I know, this is a first in the CBI industry.

The selected CBI firm will design, launch, promote, and operate Argentina’s first CBI program over a four-year period, working under the Agencia de Programas de Ciudadanía por Inversión (APCI).

This is no small task, and it will be the first CBI in Latin America after Peru terminated its $25K CBI program, which was closed in 1993 following public outrage and controversy.

So far Argentina’s potential price tag, source of funds and due diligence process already shows how much the CBI market has matured over the years, and the fact that the country is calling on experienced mobility firms to help structure the program underscores that this effort is not just a whim from the Milei administration to score a few headlines.

By the end of Q1 2026 it should be clear which firm will end up structuring the CBI program. The winning bid will shape one of Latin America’s first direct citizenship-by-investment pathways.

See you in the Jungle, anon!

Share

Other ways to get in touch:

• 1x1 Consultations: book a 1x1 consultation for more information about obtaining residency, citizenship or investing in Argentina here.

• March 2026 Event: The Wandering Investor Live Group Trip: Buenos Aires 2026. Get tickets here.

• X/Twitter: definitely most active here, you can also find me on Instagram but I hardly use that account.

• Podcasts: You can find previous appearances on podcasts etc here.

• YouTube: Check out my channel for real estate info and more.

• WiFi Agency: My other (paid) blog on how to start a digital agency from A to Z.

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Paper in fire
Stinking up the ashtrays
Paper in fire
Smoking up the alleyways

— John Mellencamp, Paper in Fire (1987)

On January 14, 2026, the government of Javier Milei eliminated tariffs and reduced printing duties to 0% for publishing materials. The reason stems from the initiative to reduce production costs and modernize administrative processes to improve the production and distribution of materials.

This decision applies to the printing of newspapers, magazines, books, and other printed materials. This is the first time in more than 80 years that the control over paper has been liberated to such an extent.

Control Paper, Control Speech

As we have seen before in Peronist Ping Pong, Argentina has a long lasting history with freedom of press (more with the lack thereof) and censorship.

In the first two presidencies of Perón (1946-1955), the State was the main distributor of paper for newspaper, and so the government could decide which newspapers got enough of it to distribute to a wide enough audience:

At the start of 1946, during the regime initiated by the dictatorship of 1943, an Executive Order was issued that would later prove crucial for Perón to muzzle the journalistic opposition: an authorization to the Executive Branch to provide paper for newspapers.

The management of paper for printing, with different tricks, was the start of the history of violations of freedom of the press in Argentina. The annual distribution of this raw material, fundamental to written journalism, was done through other decrees.

Towards 1969 with Perón exiled in Spain, the military dictatorship headed by Juan Carlos Onganía, announced a plan to develop basic industries in the country, including the pulp and paper industry.

In August of that year, through Law 18.312, Minister of Economy Dagnino Pastore created the Fund for the Development of Paper and Pulp Production, promoting the creation of the first national newsprint and pulp company, and imposed a 10% “contribution rate” on paper imports until the Argentine paper mill was operational.

For ten years, all the country’s newspapers paid 10% of their imports to fund the construction of a plant that, ultimately, was only awarded to a select few.

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The European Commission has been negotiating this vast agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay since 1999. It aims to create the world’s largest free trade zone, encompassing more than 700 million consumers, and eliminate tariffs on more than 90% of their bilateral trade.

Last Friday, the Council of the EU approved the trade agreement with Mercosur, paving the way for the creation of the world’s largest free trade zone. At a meeting of ambassadors in Brussels, the 27 member states of the European Union reached a qualified majority, despite the opposition announced by countries such as France, Poland and Ireland.

There were several clauses added, designed to quell the opposition of European farmers who have been dumping manure and potatoes in Brussels, Paris and across Ireland ever since the negotiations drew to a positive outcome.

It looks like this trade deal would mean the end of EUSSR farmers, or at least that is the way they interpret it.

Unelected Ursula von der Leyen does not see it that way, and has already confirmed a trip to Asunción, Paraguay, to place the final signature below the fine print of the trade deal on January 17.

Even if the agreement is signed in Asunción, it will not immediately enter into force. Honoring the inner workings of true colossal bureaucracies like those that can only be spun up in Brussels, the agreement also requires the approval of the European Parliament, which must issue its decision within several weeks.

The outcome there is far from certain, as some 150 MEPs (out of a total of 720) are threatening legal action to prevent the agreement’s implementation. So everything could still be shot down last minute.

So what exactly what is the controversy in the trade deal and how will this impact the Mercosur and the EU? Let’s find out.

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